Editor’s note: Jim Krug has followed the ups and downs of the Pittsburgh Pirates since the late 1980s. He wrote over 150 articles about the Pirates from 2010-16 for online sports site isportsweb.com. This is the second in a three-part series examining the challenges of Major League Baseball.

Large-market clubs neutering the draft

Prior to 2012, smaller-market teams like the Pirates had one opportunity to best their large powerhouse counterparts — outspend them in the draft.

(I could make a very strong argument that today’s notion of “small market” is a myth, but that’s for another time.)

Pittsburgh spent well over recommended amounts to lure away prospects like Stetson Allie from college commitments.

First-round talent also slid deeper in the draft if leveraging a full scholarship from a prominent NCAA program. While not all of the Pirates’ over-slotsignings like Allie panned out, this was a viable loophole for smaller teams to develop elite talent, while they couldn’t compete acquiring it through free agency.

Large market teams protested, and MLB officially “capped” the first 10 rounds of the draft in 2012, allotting each organization signing bonus limits based on their draft positions.

This has unsigned and slip to another team in a future year, or “pool” their entire 10-round allotment to sign one player.

If you see a team like the Pirates suddenly drafting unknown players beginning in round two, that’s why. Ironically, the total amount renegade small market teams spent had a bizarre effect on the draft ever since.

Many players honor their NCAA commitments when signing bonuses are only a fraction of what their scholarships offer.

Teams can be held hostage by high profile first-round picks, and face a poison pill: Either let their best prospect remain on previous drafts was only a few million dollars — no more than MLB clubs spend in a blink to sign a veteran utility infielder for a single season.

Attacking the shift

The rich tapestry of Major League Baseball is not as tightly woven as other leagues, and given the sheer expanse of games, dramatic changes to the pattern can occur.

The past few seasons have seen pitchers bat eighth (prior to the universal DH rule), and the rediscovery of “openers” — relief pitchers or an arm other than the scheduled starting pitcher to begin a game.

(Surprisingly, the first opener was employed during Game 7 of the 1924 World Series. The Pirates even surprised the Cincinnati Reds with an opener during the 1990 NLCS, as righty Ted Power took the hill prior to announced starter, lefty Zane Smith.)

The shift has been both dramatic and polarizing since its rediscovery around 2018.

An umbrella term for playing any fielder out of their natural position, it usually refers to teams positioning three infielders on one side of the diamond, leaving one alone on the other.

Shifts countered upwards of 65,000 plate appearances in 2021, including the advent of softball-style four-man outfields.

Yet proof that shifts provide fielding teams a statistical advantage is elusive, with Statcast data showing a decrease in batting average countered by increases in walks and home runs.

That didn’t stop MLB from outlawing shifts beginning in 2023, mandating two infielders on both sides of the diamond. This is pure ego on the part of hitters, who can easily drop a check swing or drag bunt down a nearly deserted opposite side of the infield and jog to first base.

Instead many MLB hitters, slighted by a violation of baseball’s “unwritten rules,” insist on powering through the shift, accelerating the recent launch angle trend in which home runs — and strikeouts — skyrocket.

Now, an invaluable and unique part of baseball strategy is lost for good.

Krug, 42, is the director of the Neil Armstrong Planetarium at Altoona Area High School.