A federal appeals court, by a 2-1 decision, will allow a former inmate of a state correctional institution to seek money damages on a claim that his parole to a halfway house was delayed because he was blind.

A panel of judges with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia last week reviewed a decision by U.S. District Stephanie L. Haines in Johnstown in which she dismissed claims by Alan Decker, 61, of Allegheny County that Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections treated him “in a substantially more adverse manner than others who have been granted parole.”

In 2023, Decker filed a federal claim that his delay in being freed from confinement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans With Disabilities Act and the federal Rehabilitation Act.

After a review of the Decker complaint by Magistrate Judge Keith A. Pesto, who recommended dismissal of Decker’s claims, Haines determined that much of Decker’s complaint involved a time period outside the statute of limitations, and dismissed his ADA claim that was within the statute.

Decker, who eventually was released to a halfway house in Harrisburg, appealed the dismissal of his claims.

The panel included Third Circuit Judges Cheryl Ann Krause, Jane R. Roth and Peter H. Phipps.

In last week’s decision, Judges Krause and Roth upheld the dismissal of claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the Fourteenth Amendment, but vacated the District Court’s dismissal of Decker’s ADA claim that involved delay in Decker’s placement that occurred between June 30, 2021, and Oct. 26, 2022, a period before Decker’s placement in a halfway house that was not barred due to the two-year statute of limitations for such claims.

Phipps, however, filed a separate two-page opinion, stating, “In my view, the Majority Opinion (of the Third Circuit) correctly upholds the District Court’s denial of Decker’s claims for violations of equal protection and the Rehabilitation Act, but it errs in vacating the dismissal of his Title II claim (a claim under ADA barring discrimination against individuals with disabilities) and in allowing Decker to pursue compensatory damages.”

He noted that modern prisons provide many activities and services to inmates (medical, vocational and educational), but, he argued, a halfway house is not a benefit under Title II, and he stated, “Decker should not be viewed as stating a plausible Title II Claim.”

He thus disagreed with Krause and Roth, who vacated Haines’ dismissal of the ADA claim.

Decker complained that there was a lengthy delay in his grant of parole to a halfway house, a delay that others, who were not disabled, did not suffer.

Those reviewing the case agreed that Decker was a difficult individual to place, but as the case record showed, he was able to care for himself. For instance, he did not need a wheelchair as some claimed.

Yet, DOC denied him placement in his home county.

He was then offered placement in a personal care facility in Philadelphia, which he rejected. He continued to request placement in a state-run halfway house.

The Third Circuit opinion, however, mentioned another situation that may have been problematic in the Decker case.

Decker, it noted, is not “similarly situated to all other parolees.”

He served time for child sexual abuse and was found to be a Sexually Violent Predator.

“Pennsylvania law imposes unique collateral consequences on sex offenders,” according to the Third Circuit opinion.

That could be a reason “that can explain DOC’s different placement decisions,” the opinion stated.

The Decker case was remanded to the Haines court “for further proceedings,” according to the Third Circuit.